Achieving all-encompassing component-level security in power system IT infrastructures is difficult, owing to its cost and potential performance implications.
T he vision of the smart grid introduces challenges for both the power-engineering and IT communities. From a power-engineering perspective, the challenge is integrating distributed generation and renewable energy sources with large-scale central power generation and demand-side management, without losing operational efficiency or power system reliability. The solution to this challenge seems to be a tighter integration of the power system and IT. However, this means the power grid will rely increasingly on the reliable and secure operation of the communication and IT infrastructure.
Reliability and performance have traditionally been key design goals for power system IT infrastructures; only in recent years has security received attention. Power system IT infrastructures used to be isolated, stand-alone systems but are increasingly integrated with other IT infrastructures at power utilities, including public infrastructures. The primary reasons for IT integration are increased business efficiency and effectiveness and reduced operational costs, for instance, by letting corporate decision-makers obtain instant access to critical data about their operating assets. Information flow across system boundaries is expected to increase in the smart grid.
Integrating the power system IT infrastructure with other IT infrastructures and accessing information across system boundaries increase the power system IT infrastructure's exposure to attacks; therefore, security will be increasingly important. When designing the security solutions for future power systems, we should learn from past lessons in securing the existing infrastructure.
First, implementing the smart grid will be a long, evolutionary process starting from today's power grid, both in terms of technology and organizational structure. The new deployments will have to coexist and interoperate with old, legacy equipment and fit into the current organizational structures and security practices.
Second, the power system's communication and IT infrastructure must satisfy diverse application requirements. At one extreme-exchanging management information between utilities-data is transferred in batches with very loose delay constraints, and standard cryptographic protocols such as TLS (Transport Layer Security) can provide authentication and confidentiality. At the other extreme-substation automation and inter-substation protection-communication delays must be kept in the order of a few milliseconds, so the delay that encryption algorithms introduce is critical for proper system operation. Thus, security solutions might have to be tailor-made for specific application scenarios.
Third, the power system's communication and IT infrastructure already consists of numerous components. The cost of securing the millions of components of a continent-wide infrastructure can be prohibitive; therefore, understanding how the security of individual system components contributes to and affects the power grid's secure operation is important. Also, in addition to the traditional IT and communication infrastructure security solutions and practices, physical process models can often be leveraged to improve system security in a cyberphysical system.
In this article, we survey some recent results related to power system information security.
Component-vs. System-Level SCADA Security
At the heart of the IT infrastructure for power system control and operation are Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems. SCADA systems remotely collect vast amounts of real-time process measurements taken from the grid (for instance, in transformer stations) and include functions for the remote control of process devices, such as breakers and tap changers. SCADA presents the acquired data to the operators in the central control room via an advanced GUI and alerts them to changing operating conditions. Many SCADA systems include computerized models of the supervised process (that is, the power system), which enable simulation of alternative process states parallel to the physical process and can be used for optimization and contingency analysis.
In addition to centralized control, SCADA has many local control systems in transformer substations. The intelligence in those distributed local systems varies from data acquisition units with simple logic to advanced control systems. Local control system functions, such as protection and interlocks, have stringent performance requirements on the underlying communication infrastructure. Altogether, the central SCADA systems, the distributed substation automation systems, and the communication between them constitute a complex "system of systems," which we refer to as the power system control and operation system (see Figure 1) .
Performance, Reliability, and Security
A particular challenge when studying power system control and operation system security is handling the mix of modern and legacy system components. The typical lifetime of a power system control and operation system component is often very long. Equipment located in the primary substations tends to be older owing to the cost and the difficulty of replacement; it's not uncommon to have 30-year-old equipment, such as remote terminal units (RTUs), with similarly old proprietary communication protocols. At the same time, the central system at the control room might be relatively modern and can consist of a variety of third-party products, such as relational databases and power applications.
With a history of proprietary system components Achieving security in slowly evolving power system control and operation systems is a complex problem. Simply adding state-of-the-art security solutions and mechanisms to existing systems is often unfeasiblesecurity solutions can violate performance and reliability requirements, which continue to have highest priority. Some security solutions would probably meet the requirements if completely new systems and architectures were deployed. However, because we operate with a large share of legacy equipment, the challenge of power system control and operation system security design is finding a proper trade-off between security, system properties such as performance and reliability, and cost. Table 1 illustrates the heterogeneity of some power system applications' performance and the security requirements. The system must provide high levels of integrity and availability while satisfying diverse performance requirements.
Another challenge in securing evolving power system control and operation systems is that security itself has many facets. The list of security mechanisms or practices can be long-firewalls, access control, authentication mechanisms, hardened operating systems, secure communication, and intrusion detection systems, just to mention a few. All these are good practice for improving system security. In addition, overall security is dependent on organizational issues, such as security awareness among staff so that passwords aren't revealed, USB sticks aren't introduced without proper precautions, and so forth.
Many standards and reference reports cover aspects of system security, some with a focus on industrial control systems. One of the more extensive works on power systems is the US National Institute of Standards and Technology's smart grid security reports. 1 One challenge when designing system security solutions is comprehending how all the implementable security measures affect and depend on each other: whereas some measures might complement each other, others might be counterproductive. It's often said that system security is no better than its weakest link. A few advanced security 
Systemwide Security Analysis
This problem's complexity calls for a systemwide conceptual framework. In the EU FP7 Viking project, we developed a system architecture modeling language, called the Cyber Security Modeling Language (CySeMoL), to model and analyze power system control and operation system security. 2 An important requirement for this modeling language is that the assessment it delivers should take a holistic approach to cybersecurity. However, when looking at security from a systemwide perspective, the amount of detailed parameters influencing system security is enormous. In practice, all parameters are simply impossible to survey consistently. One way to manage the overwhelming complexity is to use a top-down approach. This raises the level of abstraction, abandoning a deductive and deterministic approach in favor of an indicative and probabilistic one. The analysis mechanism is based on attack graphs, but owing to the system level of abstraction, the graphs aren't deterministic (as Bruce Schneier originally suggested 3 ) but instead are implemented in Bayesian networks. Bayesian networks quantify conditional dependencies between random variables, which represent the system's security state. By combining the Bayesian attack graphs with a system architecture modeling language, we can achieve an integrated security analysis mechanism for system architecture models. The resulting security estimates are thus probabilities that attacks will be successful, rather than formally proven statements that the systems are in a secure or insecure state. Teodor Sommestad and colleagues presented the first version of the modeling language following these ideas in "A Probabilistic Relational Model for Security Risk Analysis. " 4 More detailed attack graphs require quantified conditional probabilities, which is an important area of ongoing work with some initial results. Figure 2 illustrates the concept of attack graphs. In this simple example, the goal is to gain access to the SCADA server, which can be achieved, for example, through a man-in-the-middle attack. The attack's success depends on how well the communication links are protected as well as the strength of the authentication protocol used to communicate with the SCADA system. By comparing the likelihood of different attack paths, industrial decision-makers can prioritize the possible countermeasures and choose which equipment to upgrade or install first. This model-based, top-down approach thus supports rational decision-making for improving cybersecurity in large and complex legacy system architectures.
Model-Based Secure State Estimation
Our modeling language provides a high-level estimate of the ICT infrastructure's security but disregards the inherent resilience of certain SCADA system functionalities. One of SCADA communications' primary functions is to remotely monitor the physical process, usually referred to as power system state estimation. Many energy management applications use power system states, and timely estimates are crucial to ensure proper system operation.
To ensure high system availability, measurement data for state estimation is collected such that estimation is possible even if a fraction of the measurement equipment fails. Thus, securing all communications might not be necessary to protect the state estimation functionality against attacks.
S2CC Communications
In general, the SCADA communications related to power system state monitoring and estimation are called to as S2CC communication. However, S2CC's purpose is not only to enable power system state monitoring but also to control the substation actuators. Traditionally, S2CC was performed over low bitrate point-to-point transmission links, for instance, using power-line communications, microwave, and leased lines. Modern S2CCs increasingly use cellular, satellite, Figure 2 . An attack tree illustrating hypothetical possibilities for accessing a SCADA server. In this simple example, the goal is to gain access to the server, which can be achieved, for example, through a man-in-the-middle attack. and optical communications. Data rates can be on the order of a few Mbits per second for phasor measurement unit (PMU) data transmission. Figure 3 shows a simple power system and the corresponding S2CC communication infrastructure. SCADA has a variety of application layer protocols for S2CC, and different protocols often coexist in a SCADA system. Legacy protocols, such as Modbus and equipment vendors' proprietary protocols, were slowly replaced by protocols standardized in the past decade, such as DNP3 and IEC 60870-5 for data acquisition and control or IEEE C37.118-2005 for PMU data. Neither the legacy nor the standardized protocols were developed with information security in mind, because communication channels were thought to be well protected and substations were manned, which made physical access to measurement and communication equipment difficult.
Motivated by the increased use of shared communication channels and the spread of unmanned substations, security extensions that provide confidentiality, integrity, and authentication were standardized recently for these protocols, such as the IEC62351-5 for IEC60870-5. Communications with legacy equipment that doesn't support the security extensions can be secured using bump-in-the-wire (BITW) solutions, such as AGA-12 and YASIR. 6 A BITW solution consists of two devices that are inserted in the communication link near the sender and the receiver. The sender-side device encrypts the sender's output, which the receiverside device then decrypts. The sender and receiver aren't aware of the BITW devices.
Although security solutions are available for most communication protocols, deployment has been slow because of not only associated equipment costs but also the overhead of managing encryption keys and the potential impact of encryption on data availability in case of a lockout.
Communication vs. Application Layer Security
Although data integrity and authentication are necessary to secure control communications from the control center to the substations, we can achieve secure power system state estimation at a much lower cost because of the inherent redundancy in the substations' measurements. Typical measurements sent over the SCADA network include steady-state active and reactive power flows, power injections, and voltages. Using basic power systems modeling, 7 it's relatively straightforward to write down a system of equations relating the expected measurements to the power system's physical state.
Because the number of measurements typically far exceeds the number of state variables for a fixed physical state, the expected measurements are highly correlated. That is, the measurements from one substation contain information about the measurements from neighboring substations.
The steady-state power system models capture the spatial correlation among the measurements. Because the control center collects all the measurements, we can verify whether the received measurements satisfy the power system model reasonably well using statistical tests. If the measurements don't pass the tests, then either the measurements are corrupted or some sensors are faulty (assuming the model is correct). Such tests are routinely performed in the so-called bad data detector (BDD), which identifies faulty equipment and removes erroneous data in the state estimation to provide the control center operator with the best possible state estimate. 7 We can use the state estimate to improve system efficiency as well as for contingency analysis.
BDD wasn't introduced to provide system security, but it contributes to such security at a low cost, even without encryption. Some have suggested that an intelligent adversary can fool the BDD. 8 The reason is quite simple: as long as the received measurements correspond to a possible physical state, the BDD system won't trigger an alarm. An adversary with knowledge of the power system can add a correlated corruption to several measurements without triggering an alarm. Such an attack involves tampering with several, often geographically dispersed, sensor measurements simultaneously. The adversary would need to intercept measurement data from different sensors (and usually different RTUs), which are typically delivered through different communication channels to the control center. We used this observation in "Stealth Attacks and Protection Schemes for State Estimators in Power Systems" to define a security index  k , which tries to quantify the cost of attacking a particular measurement k. 9 The integer value  k simply denotes the minimum number of measurement values or the number of S2CC communication channels that must be corrupted to alter measurement k without triggering alarms in the BDD. The attack's cost depends on S2CC's communication network; by attacking the communication between an RTU and the CC, an attacker can potentially tamper with all substation measurements.
Securing all S2CCs is the best way to avoid such attacks. But in a medium-to large-scale power system, with thousands of measurements and potentially hundreds of substations, upgrading all equipment to support security would be costly. An important question is how we can increase system security by incrementally upgrading equipment-that is, incrementally installing secure communication channels. Researchers have addressed this question previously, introducing a limited number of encrypted communication channels to improve system security, as measured by  k .
9,10 Ultimately, by combining traditional BDD and securing a carefully selected subset of measurements (or communication channels), we can determine that an adversary can't attack a measurement without triggering a BDD alarm. Figure 4 shows how the attack cost increases with the number of secure communication channels.
Other types of equipment can incrementally improve state estimation security. For example, PMUs, which are expected to be widely used in the smart grid, provide measurement data at a significantly higher rate (≥ 18 Hz) than used in today's state estimators and can capture fast transients in the power grid. PMU measurement data, like power flow and injection measurement data, consists of correlated samples from a physical process. To model the expected PMU measurements, we need a dynamic model of the power system that can capture the spatiotemporal correlation among the measurements. Adversaries using simple steady-state models will no longer be undetectable, even if the communication channels aren't secure.
State estimation, which is at the core of power system operation, is a good example of how we can improve system security at a relatively low cost by combining analytical models, secure communications, and advanced metering technology (PMUs).
Inter-Control Center Communication
Conceptually, the purpose of inter-control center communication (ICCC) is similar to S2CC communication: to monitor power system state and control substation actuators. Nevertheless, in the case of ICCC, the exchange of information and control messages occurs between different organizations, such as distribution service providers, transmission service providers, neighboring utilities, regional and national control centers, electricity producers, and other electricity market participants. Figure 5 shows an ICCC scenario based on the Italian transmission system's communication infrastructure.
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The information obtained using ICCC is often used 9 Results are shown for two greedy algorithms. MMA (Most Minimal Attacks) aims to maximize the average attack cost; MSM (Most Shortest Minimal Attacks) aims to maximize the smallest attack cost. MSM performs better with respect to both aims. In particular, when securing 36 out of the 118 RTUs using MSM, the adversary can't make undetectable attacks against any RTU (the minimum attack cost is infinite). in the state estimation process; therefore, ICCC security affects state estimation security. In a smart grid environment, reliance on ICCC is expected to increase for several reasons. First, the number of independently managed electricity market participants will likely increase, and their secure operation requires information about the state of other market participants. Second, owing to its distributed nature, the smart grid's stability will rely increasingly on wide area measurement and control systems, which will span several geographically distant market participants and might require real-time data delivery with stringent delay and throughput requirements.
Cryptographic Communication Security
Although ICCCs use many proprietary protocols, the predominant protocol is the ICCP (IEC60870-6/ TASE.2). ICCP provides a point-to-point connection, called an association, between a pair of nodesthat is, two control centers. Two nodes can maintain several ICCP associations with each other simultaneously and can use different associations to exchange data with different priorities. The rationale for maintaining several associations is that the service-level requirements of the information exchanged between two nodes span a wide range, from real-time data exchange with stringent delay requirements to the bulk exchange of planning data and schedules. ICCP operates on a variety of transport layer protocols, both connectionless and connection oriented, but is most often used over TCP/IP.
Although ICCP was standardized only a few years ago, it doesn't include confidentiality, integrity, or authentication. It provides access control only via bilateral tables, which specify the access rights between two control centers that have an ICCP association. Lower-layer protocols can provide confidentiality, integrity, and authentication, for example, by using TLS when ICCP is used over the TCP/IP protocol stack. The number of nodes connected by ICCP associations in today's power systems is relatively low-in the order of tenstherefore, control centers are relatively well protected, and key management isn't an issue in practice today.
Beyond Cryptographic Security: Information Availability
With the problems of integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and access control solved to a large extent, the most important issue in ICCC is information availability. Unlike in the past, when ICCC was performed mainly over dedicated point-to-point connections, such as leased lines, communication is shifting to public wide area networks, such as the Internet. The use of public network infrastructures might be cheaper, but it poses stringent requirements on network availability and exposes ICCC to denial-of-service attacks. We Inter-Control Communications Protocol (ICCP) delivers data from the communication nodes to the transmission system operator's three regional control centers, the three regional control centers, and the independent system operator's three regional control centers. ICCP also communicates to the control center of the Union for the Coordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE). For simplicity, the figure doesn't show ICCP connections to power generation control centers. Denial-of-service attacks are even more difficult to mitigate. Attackers monitoring the data traffic of encrypted ICCP associations can use traffic analysis to extract information. They can detect the increase of data rates, which is typically a sign of abnormal system state, and disable communication when it's most needed. One way to mitigate traffic-analysis attacks is through masking, that is, through continuously transmitting at the peak rate. Another way is to do relaying over a mixing network, in which every node delays every message at random upon relaying. In principle, ICCP allows associations to be relayed over control centers, so that a mixing network can hide the identity of the sender and the receiver of an ICCP association from an outside attacker. 13 Nevertheless, a mixing network introduces the possibility of inside attacks. Because of SCADA systems' long life cycles, software corruption is a threat, and the code base's complexity makes detecting corruption difficult. A compromised control center can reveal the mixing network's routing information and thereby enable attacks. One possible solution to mitigate the attacks even in the presence of compromised control centers is to use anonymity networks to establish overlay routing paths among the control centers. An anonymity network hides the sender and the receiver of the messages routed through the overlay from the relaying nodes, making it difficult for an inside attacker to identify the associations between the nodes. 13 Depending on whether it's the sender, the receiver, or the association that is to be hidden, an anonymity network can provide sender, receiver, or relationship anonymity.
Mixing and anonymity networks help mitigate attacks, but they come at the price of increased data rates and end-to-end delay. Increased data rates lead to increased communication costs, and long delays are undesirable for time-sensitive data; accordingly, the mixing and anonymity networks must be configured appropriately. Optimal system parameters might be hard to find in practice as they depend on the actual number of attackers, the number of communicating nodes, and the traffic matrix. 14 R etrofitting a system as complex as today's power system communication and IT infrastructure and preparing it for the smart grid's requirements are complex and challenging tasks. We believe that IT and communication security solutions for today and tomorrow's power systems must be designed with system-level security in mind, not only because doing so lets us maximize the benefit of security investments but also because it ensures that the solutions satisfy the requirements in terms of performance, availability, and cost.
